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Abstraks 
Tradisi perang berbasis keadilan dapat ditemukan dalam sejarah pemikiran 
politik Islam pada masa awal khalifah Islam. Dalam kajian ini, penulis 
menggunakan dua pisau analisis yaitu interpretasi tekstual terhadap Alquran dan 
Hadis, dan interpretasi sejarah perang suci dalam tradisi Islam. Penelitian ini 
bertujuan untuk menggali prinsip-prinsip dasar jihad, dan membandingkannya 
dengan teori perang berbasis keadilan untuk menemukan sisi persamaan dan 
perbedaanya, serta membangun argumentasi apakah jihad bisa dikategorikan 
sebagai bentuk perang yang memenuhi rasa keadilan masyarakat yang tertindas. 
Studi kasus dalam kajian ini adalah konsepsi jihad Imam Samudra dalam buku 
kontroversialnya “Aku Melawan Teroris”. Dengan menggunakan analisa Jus Ad 
Bellum dan Jus In Bello, ditemukan bahwa apabila jihad dipandang sebagai 
sesuatu yang sakral dan suci, maka kesucian jihad tidak bisa dikotori dengan 
tindakan terorisme. Dalam perspektif teologi dan hukum Islam, penelitian ini 
membuktikan penyalahgunaan ayat-ayat jihad oleh Imam Samudra untuk 
menjastifikasi tindakan terorisme yang dilakukannya di Bali.  
 
Abstract 
Just war traditions may exist in Islam dating back to the history of Islamic 
political thought from the early Islamic empire. Accordingly, textual 
interpretation on the Qur’an and the Hadith, and historical background on 
Islamic holy war, would be inevitable in this study. This study is aimed at 
assessing the main principles of jihad, and comparing them with the theory of 
just war in order to grasp some commonalities, if any, and building 
argumentations whether or not jihad could be deemed as a just war. In order to 
sharpen the understanding of these principles, one case study of jihadist theory in 
Indonesian context will be applied and analyzed, notably Imam Samudra’s 
principle of jihad in his controversial book ‘Aku Melawan Teroris.’ Under the 
framework of jus ad bellum and jus ad bello, this study reveals that if jihad is 
seen as holy, just and sacred, no one will justified to commit terrorism and 
violence under the guise of jihad. In addition, using juristic and theological 
approach of jihad, this study finds that Imam Samudra, one of the masterminds of 
Bali bombing, is guilty of using some Quranic verses regarding jihad and abusing 
it to justify his attacks on the island. 
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A.  Introduction 
In the light of history, St. Ambrose wrote the notion of just war prior to the 
idea of Just War Theory (JWT) proposed by St. Augustine. Long before these 
two philosophers, just war traditions were embedded in two great empires in that 
time, the Roman and the Greeks. As a matter of fact, three prominent 
philosophers in the Roman Empire, Cicero, Plato, and Aristotle, wrote the same 
issues of moral consideration for leaders and soldiers before going to the 
battlefields. In addition, the just war tradition not only belongs to Western 
civilization, but also to other civilization such as China and India. Take for 
instance, Mo Tzu and Mencius from China, both wrote and discussed ‘the 
injustice’ and ‘the necessity’ to wage war to fight against the state of injustice. In 
India, two famous books the Laws of Manu (1991) and the Bhadavad Gita (1968) 
contain the concept and the ethics of war.1 
From this stand point, just war traditions may also exist in Islam dating 
back to the history of Islamic political thought from the early Islamic empire. It 
is, therefore, textual interpretation on the Qur’an and the Hadith, and historical 
background on Islamic holy war, would be inevitable in this study.  On this 
regard, the paramount need is to prove whether or not jihad, (a spirit of Islamic 
war) like any other wars, comprises a just cause and a legal authority as core 
principles of the Just War Theory (JWT).  
This study is aimed at assessing the main principles of jihad, and 
comparing them with the theory of just war in order to grasp some 
commonalities, if any, and building argumentations whether or not jihad could be 
deemed as a just war. With regards to various meanings of jihad, one would 
argue that, to some degree, the term jihad has something in common with the Just 
War Theory (JWT), albeit terrorists used and abused jihad for the sake of their 
political agenda. In order to sharpen the understanding of these principles, one 
case study of jihadist theory in Indonesian context will be applied and analyzed, 
notably Imam Samudra’s principle of jihad in his controversial book ‘Aku 
Melawan Teroris’ or ‘I fight against the Real Terorist’.2 
This paper is outlined into three parts. In the first part, the possibility of the 
idea on holy war in Islam from historical perspectives is broadly presented, and 
then Islamic holy war and just war are compared to see their commonalities. In 
the next section, JWT and jihad are discussed and analyzed. The last is 
conclusion. 
 
                                                 
1Nicholas Fotion. Reaction to War: Pacism, Realism, and Just War Theory, in Andrew 
Valls (ed).  Ethics in International Affairs. (USA:Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2000), 15-32. 
2Imam Samudra. Aku Melawan Teroris or I fight against the Real Terrorist. (Solo: Jazera, 
2004). 
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B.  The Idea of Holy War in Islamic History: A Myth or Reality? 
Jihad is an Arabic vocabulary derived from the verb jahada meaning to 
exert, to struggle, or to strive. In the Arabic-English lexicon written by Edward 
Lane, jihad is literally defined as ‘exerting one’s utmost power, efforts, 
endeavours, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobation’.3 In this 
narrower sense, Jihad cannot be regarded as holy war.4 However, one would 
argue that since the term jihad is always referred to the Qur’an, a Muslims’ holy 
book, and the Hadist, the Prophet’s sayings and traditions, mostly related with 
the conditions to resort to war (as this study will prove it later in this paper), and 
considering the Quran is a holy guidance revealed from God, jihad, in this 
broader sense, could be meant holy war. 
In the Qur’an, jihad is evident to be qualified by the word ‘in the path of 
God’, describing conditions to wage a war against infidels in the first Islamic 
society. In the Hadith, jihad is always associated with armed acts and military 
activities in the classical tenure of Islam around the first three centuries.5  
In his famous book entitled The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic 
Tradition, Johnson6 mentions that the notion of holy war in Western tradition 
rooted in three main historical dimensions: the Old Testament, the Crusades, and 
the religious wars of the post-Reformation era. Accordingly, the idea of holy war 
in Islam aimed, as Johnson argues:  
Not to be systematic or comprehensive, but rather to render the diversity 
and commonality that exists both in holy war phenomena and in what 
scholars take to be definitive of holy war.7  
 
For this purpose only, Johnson insists on using the term jihad to be 
simplistically meant holy war.8 Accordingly, it is not impossible to draw a linear 
line between these contrasting ideologies namely western doctrines of just war 
and Islamic doctrines of holy war regardless their distinct nature in characters.  
                                                 
3Edward Lane. An Arabic English Lexicon, bk. I, (London: William and Norgate, 1865), 
473 cited in Roxanne L. Euben  Killing For Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action. 
Political Theory. V.30, No.1,  February 2000:12 
4Robert Kennedy. Is One Person’s Terrorist Another’s Freedom Fighther? Western and 
Islamic Approached to ‘Just War’ Compared. (Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 1999), 
Vol.11, No.1, 1-21. See also Michael G. Knapp. The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam. 
(Parameters: Spring 2003), 82-94, and Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and 
Practice. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
5Bernard Lewis. The Political Language of Islam. (USA: The University of Chicago Press, 
1988), 72. 
6See James Turner Johnson. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions. (USA: 
the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 33 
7Johnson. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, 37 
8Johnson. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, 29 
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Correspondingly, Bonner suggests that the significance of comparing just 
war and jihad in anthropological perspectives lies in three important points. First, 
it is helpful to trace the lineage between jihad and war in Arabia before Islam. 
Second, it is pivotal to investigate the function of jihad as a means of conversion 
to Islam of other tribal and nomadic community like the Turks and the Berbers in 
Central Asia and North Africa. Third, it is not at odds with the Muslim jurists’ 
conception on jihad because “for them any authentic instance of jihad was 
necessarily both holy and just.9 
 
C.  Just War Theory in Western and Islamic Perspectives: a Brief 
Outlook  
Admittedly it is not easy to draw a comprehensive comparison of Just War 
Theory (JWT) in Western and Islamic traditions as both are completely different 
in values and doctrines. Kennedy felt that he “… [was] well aware of the hazards 
of any attempts to summarize western Christian, secular and Islamic just war 
tradition.”10 Kennedy is absolutely right as one could feel the same. Nonetheless, 
despite this complexity, one is convinced that those just war traditions in Islam 
and the West may differ in some degree but they share commonalities in some 
points. As Bulliet (2004) suggests: 
The term Islamo-Christian civilization denotes a prolonged and fateful 
intertwining of sibling societies enjoying sovereignty in neighbouring 
geographical regions and following parallel historical trajectories. Neither 
the Muslim nor the Christian historical path can be fully understood 
without relation to the other.11 
 
On this account, by comparing the war traditions in Western and Islamic 
doctrines, it is pivotal to trace the relationship between these competing 
ideologies in order to deconstruct the doctrine of jihad within the framework of 
just war theory. In what follows, if my analysis on jihad and just war is valid, the 
Islamo-Christian war traditions will form its parallel historical lineage. 
In doing so, it is important clarify some important points. As mentioned 
earlier, using jihad in parallel meaning with holy war may raise controversy as 
jihad is literally not synonymous with holy war. Nonetheless, for the purpose of 
this critical analysis, it is inevitable to put it simply in this way to challenge this 
                                                 
9Michael Bonner. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 5. 
10Robert Kennedy. Is One Person’s Terrorist Another’s Freedom Fighther? Western and 
Islamic Approached to ‘Just War’ Compared. (Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 1999, 
Vol.11, No.1), 4. 
11Richard Bulliet. The Case for Islamo Christian Civilization. (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2004), 10. 
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dispute as well as to open a room for discussion, and thus to ‘deorentalize’ jihad 
from a stereotype the West perceive it as terrorist ideology to holy and just. 
Another note to underline, the theory of just war is, to a greater extent, more 
structured than the theory of Islamic holy war in terms of its etymology and 
epistemology. On this account, the comparison will fall under the doctrines of 
JWT; jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 
 
D.  Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello: Western and Islamic Doctrines 
Compared  
According to Primoratz12, the concept of Just War is in conjunction with 
the ethics of war in two frameworks. First is the main requirement of moral 
justification to wage a war, namely, jus ad bellum. Second is the vital condition 
which allows or forbid to do in that war, that is jus in bello. Under jus ad bellum 
principle, the reason of declaring war by a state must be based on the justice. The 
war can be either defensive or has a right of intervention in a narrower sense. On 
the basis of jus in bello principle, legitimate targets such as warriors and civilians 
may become the objects. These two requirements, in Primoratz’s account, are 
mutually independent: 
Whether your cause is just or not, you can fight for it in a ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’ 
way. And the justice of your cause does not absolve you of the duty to 
fight ‘clean’.13  
 
By comparison, Islamic doctrine on jus ad bellum and jus in bello, quoting 
Butterworth14, can be found in the work of al-Farabi (d.950), a great Islamic 
philosopher in the medieval age, on justice and injustice before and after 
conducting war. Al-Farabi (d.950) sets a basic foundation of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello in accordance with conditions that justify wars on the basis of just or 
unjust principles. In Farabi’s view, ‘they are unjust if they serve a ruler’s narrow, 
selfish purposes or if they are devoted solely to conquest and bloodshed.’ Under 
jus ad bellum criterion, the war can be either defensive or offensive depending on 
the context in which wars occur. Finally, the cause of the war must be based on 
social justice and prosperity for all people, as suggested by Farabi “…what 
                                                 
12Igor Primoratz. Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory: Some Issues of Responsibility. 
(Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1997, Vol.5),  222 
13Primoratz. Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory: Some Issues of Responsibility, 222. 
14See Charles E. Butterworth, Al-Faˆraˆbıˆ’s Statecraft: War and the Well-Ordered Regime. 
cited in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson  Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and 
Limitation of War inWestern and Islamic Traditions, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), 79-100. 
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makes the just is their role in achieving the well-being of the virtuous city, that 
association which we all need in order to attain happiness”.15 
While war in Islam can be both defensive and offensive, according to 
Gration, in Christian doctrines, the war ought to be defensive, though he never 
forbids religious wars.16 In western tradition, religious war or holy war is best 
defined, according to Johnson,17 as ‘conflicts that have a strong ideological, 
motivational, social, or other connection with one major religious tradition or 
another.’ This holy war in Christian history, Johnson points out, emerges in three 
main historical horizons: the Old Testament, the Crusades, and the religious wars 
of the post-Reformation era.18 Here, both Islam and Christianity shares common 
ground on the phenomenology of religious war.  
In Muqaddima, a prolegomena to Islamic history, as cited by Butterworth, 
Ibn Khaldun (d.1406) states that wars will always happened in the world since 
God creates it automatically and inevitably. This is because, he argues, it is 
intended for human’s revenge and self-defense. According to Ibn Khaldun, there 
are, at least, four kinds of War. At the first place, war usually happens within 
neighbouring clans and competing families. Second, it is caused by hostility, in 
which the people living in the desert were fighting each other intended merely to 
steal their belongings. Both wars are called in Arabic hurub bagby wa fitna or 
wars of outrage and sedition, and these two are considered unjust and lawless. 
The next form of war is jihad according to the divine law, and the last is dynastic 
wars against seceders and those who refuse obedience, and they both are deemed 
wars of Jihad and Justice or hurub jihad wa’adl. By this classification,  
Butterworth underlines that Ibn Khaldun attempts to differentiate between just 
war and jihad and to its similarities and differences.19 
 
D.  The Deontological and Consequentialist Principles of Just War in 
Western and Islamic Doctrines: a Comparative Analysis 
                                                 
15See Charles E. Butterworth, Al-Faˆraˆbıˆ’s Statecraft: War and the Well-Ordered Regime. 
cited in Michael Bonner. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 5. 
16James Turner Johnson  Ideology. Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and 
Secular Concepts, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1975), 34, cited in Robert Kennedy Is One 
Person’s Terrorist Another’s Freedom Fighther? Western and Islamic Approached to ‘Just War’ 
Compared. (Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 1999, Vol.11, No.1), 6. 
17Johnson. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, 30 
18Johnson. The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, 33 
19See Butterworth, Al-Faˆraˆbıˆ’s Statecraft: War and the Well-Ordered Regime. cited in 
Michael Bonner. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice, 6. 
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Basically, Just War Theory (JWT) falls within the framework of 
deontological perspectives, because, in Hurka’s consideration20, it does not 
require the best outcomes once a war or conduct to war is being declared. 
According to Valls,21 the components of jus ad bellum contains a just cause, 
legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, probability of success, and 
proportionality, and jus in bello criteria only consists of two categories namely 
proportionality and discrimination. 
Jus Ad Bellum  
• Just Cause 
In Valls’ definition, referring to Michael Walzer’s theory (1992), a just 
cause for resorting to war should be defensive, by this she means: 
A state is taken to have a just cause when it defends it self against 
aggression, where aggression means the violation of the imminent threats 
of the violation of its territorial integrity or political independence.22  
 
In other words, Vall observes that ‘the state has a right to defend itself 
against the aggression of other states,’ and this right, as Vall emphasises, should 
be based on the right of its citizens. It is, hence, the moral obligation of the state 
is derivative, not foundational in character, meaning, it only associates with its 
citizen’s right. Here, it is apparent that this approach is based on the dominant 
(liberal) opinion by which only statist perspective would disagree with it.23 
By comparison, in Islamic war tradition, according to Kennedy24, the cause 
of declaring war has to be just, including the expansion of the borders of Islamic 
territory. Nevertheless, resorting to war by using lethal force would be justifiable 
if non-Islamic empires reject to admit the sovereignty of Islam that is either by 
embracing Islam or refusing to pay taxes.  The Qur’an says: 
Fight against those who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor 
forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah, and his Messenger 
(Muhammad), and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (i.e. 
Islam) among the people of the scripture (Jews and Christian), until the 
                                                 
20Thomas Hurka. Proportionality and Necessity, in Larry May (ed). War: Essays in 
Political Philosophy. (Cambridge: University Press, 2008), 127. 
21 Andrew Valls. Can Terrorism be Justified? . in Andrew Valls (ed). Ethics in 
International Affairs. (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 
2000), 68-77. 
22Michael Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Arguments with Historical Illustrations. 
2nd Edition. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), cited in Andrew Valls (ed). Ethics in International 
Affairs. (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2000), 68. 
23See Beitz 1979b; Walzer 1992 cited in Valls, 68. 
24Robert Kennedy. Is One Person’s Terrorist Another’s Freedom Fighther? Western and 
Islamic Approached to ‘Just War’ Compared. (Terrorism and Political Violence, Spring 1999, 
Vol.11, No.1), 10. 
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pay the Jizyah (tax or tribute) with willing submission, and feel themselves 
subdued.25 
 
• Legitimate Authority 
Vall considers that the only competent body to wage war is a state. On this 
basis, she argues that the state has a right to monopolize a legitimate use of force. 
Similarly, allowing other illegal individuals or institutions to commit violence 
would generate conflicts, and these conflicts would be deemed as criminal acts.26 
It is noteworthy that legitimate authority, as suggested by Coates (1997), 
should be based on the common good of which the state is ordered, and to the 
law of which it is subject. This is, Coates argues, because of the right of the state 
to go to war is not stemmed from its de facto or coercive sovereignty, but from 
its membership of an international community. This condition, Coates notes, 
could also be applied to the level of individual committing violence intended to 
defend his self out of his individual interests or his act is a representative of the 
community and an upholder of the law, this kind of person is justifiable to use 
force to resort to conflict.27 
While Vall considers a state as the sole competent body to resort to 
conflict, Islamic war tradition allows only the head of the Islamic state or the 
spiritual leader to declare war. Jihad, in this sense, can not be done by individual 
Muslim as a freedom fighter.28 
 
• Right Intention 
By definition, Valls states that right intention depends on the merit of the 
principle of the so-called just cause and legitimate authority. Valls explains that: 
 … if just cause and legitimate authority can be satisfied, there seems to no 
reason to think that requirements of right intention cannot be satisfied.29 
 
She further clarifies that:  
This is not to say, of course, that if the first two are satisfied, the latter is as 
well, but only that if the first requirements are met, the latter can be. All 
                                                 
25I refer all Quranic citations in this paper to Muhammad Taqiud-Din Al-Hilali and 
Muhammad Muhsin Khan (trans). “Translation of the Meanings of the Noble Qur’an in the English 
Language.” Madinah KSA: King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an. See the 
Qur’an, chapter 9, verse 29, 248.  
26Andrew Valls. Ethics in International Affairs. (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2000), 68 
27A.J. Coates. The Ethics of War. (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
1997), 127.  
28Kennedy. Is One Person’s Terrorist Another’s Freedom Fighther? Western and Islamic 
Approached to ‘Just War’ Compared. 10. 
29Valls. Can Terrorism be Justified?, 72. 
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that it requires is that the relevant actors be motivated by the just cause and 
not some other end.30 
 
According to Kennedy, resorting to wars in Islam must be based on 
Islamic values. Similarly,  Kennedy emphasises that jihad is justified only with 
right intention, not intended neither for the purpose of war, not nor for individual 
interests. Instead, it should be based on peace and security instructed by God in 
the Quran.31 The Qur’an explains: 
And  fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and worshipping of 
others along with Allah) and (all and every kind of) worship for Allah 
(alone). But if they cease, let there be no transgression except against Az-
Zalimun (the polytheist, and wrong-doers).32 
 
• Last Resort 
The principle of last resort, that is waging war as the last option, seems to 
be problematic with the ultimate end of just war aims at promoting the prospects 
of peace. It has been argued that, instead of using force, conducting allied 
diplomacy appears to be more promising to achieve a peaceful resolution of the 
crisis. For such critics, applying the last resort is almost impossible inasmuch as 
it is suspected only to delay war in uncertain time. However, according to Coates, 
the purpose of the last resort is basically to raise the moral threshold of war, but it 
is not intended that that threshold should become virtually insurmountable.33 
In line with this, Islamic holy war should only be declared if there is no 
other choice, but jihad. The Qur’an explains this clearly: 
And make them ready against them all you can of power, including steed 
of war (tanks, planes, missiles, artillery) to threaten thereby the enemy of 
Allah and your enemy, and others beside them whom you may not know, 
(but) whom Allah does know. And whatever you shall spend in the cause of 
Allah, shall be repaid to you, and you shall not be treated unjustly.34 
But if the incline to peace, you (also) incline to it, and (put your) trust in 
Allah. Verily, He is the All-Hearer, the All-Knower.35 
 
Both verses, Silverman asserts, denote the doctrine of jus ad bellum, a 
conduct to war, explaining preparation before going to the battlefields such as 
                                                 
30Valls. Can Terrorism be Justified?, 72 
31Kennedy. Is One Person’s Terrorist Another’s Freedom Fighther?, 10. 
32See the Qur’an, chapter 2, verse 193, 248 
33A.J.Coates. Just War in the Persian Gulf? in Andrew Valls (ed). Ethics in International 
Affairs. (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2000), 39-40. 
34See the Qur’an, chapter 8, verse 60, 239. 
35See the Qur’an, chapter 8, verse 61, 240. 
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weapons, bombs, soldiers, logistics, and so on, while at the same time offering an 
inclination towards peaceful solution and relation.36 
 
• Probability of Success 
According to Statman37, the fundamental notion of success is that war 
should not be waged unless it is likely to succeed, lest many human lives be lost 
in vain. It is therefore the possibility of success, as Statman argues, has to be both 
prudential and moral concerns on declaring wars. By this he means: 
As a prudential constraint, it applies to a just and just war alike. As a moral 
constraint, it applies to just wars because success in achieving an unjust 
cause is, of course, unhelpful in making the war just38 
 
By contrast, success or victory in Islamic war tradition is granted by God, 
not by the possibility of success estimated by the leader or the commander. Here, 
jihad becomes psycho-social motives that strengthen Muslims’ community to be 
involved in holy war in pursuits of spiritual payoff in the hereafter.  The Qur’an, 
states: 
Permission to fight (against disbelievers) is given to those (believers) who 
are fought against, because the have been wronged; and surely, Allah is 
able to give them (believers) victory.39 
Those who have been expelled from their homes unjustly only because they 
said: “Our Lord is Allah.” For had it not been that Allah checks one set of 
people by means of another, monasteries, churches, synagogues, and 
mosques, wherein the name of Allah is mentioned much would surely have 
been pulled down. Verily, Allah will help those who help his (cause). 
Truly, Allah is All-Strong, All-Mighty.40 
 
These two verses, as Silverman argues, are the prominent verses 
concerning jihad revealed to explain the process of conducting jihad, the time 
when jihad should be declared, and the reasons to perform jihad. From those 
verses, it can be inferred that conditions to resort to jihad requires self-defense 
against aggression and strive to fight ‘unjust action’.41  
 
• Proportionality 
                                                 
36Adam L. Silverman. Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and 
Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Violence. (Journal of Church and State, 2002), Vol. 44,  79 
37Daniel Statman, On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self‐Defense. (The Journal of 
Ethics, Vol. 118, No. 4, July 2008),  660 
38Statman,  On the Success Condition for Legitimate Self‐Defense, 660 
39See the Qur’an, chapter 22, verse 39, 448. 
40See the Qur’an, chapter 22, verse 40, 448. 
41Silverman. Just War, Jihad, and Terrorism, 78 
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Valls states that the principle of proportionality under jus ad bellum needs 
a prospective judgement, ensuring that the costs of war are not higher than its 
benefits. The problem of this judgment, she explains, lies in the fact that it seems 
almost impossible to assess the values of costs and benefits, considering that 
those values are abstract and invisible. As a consequence, there is no probability 
to judge this category with any levels of certainty.42  
By contrast, the doctrine of proportionality in Islamic principles is intended 
to prevent a revenge and hatred against the enemy. According to Silverman 
(2002:79), a Muslim may not respond in greater manner then he received. The 
Qur’an emphasizes: 
That is so. And whoever has retaliated with the like of that which he has 
made to suffer, and then has again been wronged, Allah will surely help 
him. Allah indeed is Oft-Pardoning, Oft-Forgiving.43 
 
Jus in Bello 
• Proportionality 
Just like the conditions of proportionality under jus in bellum, Valls argues 
that this category needs a sort of proportionality between the costs of an action 
and benefits to be achieved, restricting to certain conducts of war. At the same 
time, it does not allow resorting to war in the way that it engages in ordinate 
costs, costs that are disproportionate to the gains.44  
Unlike Valls who limits the principle of proportionality to certain wars, in 
Islamic doctrine of wars, Kennedy45 considers it in different sense, that is, a 
criminal is dealt a punishment equal to the crime committed, and even here 
compassion is rewarded, referring to the following Qur’anic verse: 
The recompense for an evil is an evil like thereof; but whoever forgives 
and makes reconciliation, his reward is with Allah. Verily, He likes not the 
Zalimun (oppressors, polytheists, and wrong doers).46 
 
• Discrimination 
According to Valls, the doctrine of discrimination says that in conducting a 
war, one should be able to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate 
targets of attacks, in particular, between combatants and non-combatants, or 
between, say for instance, soldiers and civilians. Here, only soldiers may be 
legitimate to attack. Nevertheless, many disagree with this category questioning 
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the moral arguments of this difference. Basically, moral justification of this 
distinction is based on separation between the innocent people, notably non-
combatants, and the guilty people namely combatants. This kind of 
discrimination seems bias due to the fact that often combatants are conscripts, 
while those who are in charge of waging war are not liable to attack.47 
With reference to the history of Islam, it was in the period of ignorance 
(jahiliyya), the Arabs before Islam had been recorded to owe principles of 
warfare similar with the Western doctrine, that was, the codes of chivalry. With 
this doctrine, Arab troops were forbidden to murder non-combatants” such as 
infants, children, women, elderly people, and disable people who were badly 
injured and almost died. This custom had been reported to become a part of 
Islamic law concerning jihad and warfare.48  The Qur’an supports this: 
And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the 
limits. Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors.49 
 
This verse reveals that jihad is recommended with certain limits, that is, 
prohibition to kill non-combatants. It has been reported that Hadits strictly 
emphasized on this issue saying that it is forbidden to kill a decrepit old man, or a 
young infant, or a woman.50 In addition, quoting Kelsay, military operation in 
Islamic warfare has to differentiate between the guilty and the innocent using a 
minimum of force to accomplish the objective.51 
Now let us turn to the consequentialist point of view within jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello criterion in detail. According to Hurka52, the concept of just war 
should consider the consequence of war, in particular, the death and destruction 
caused by war. This is, in Hurka’s view is very complicated. On this basis, the 
theory consists of some requirements to meet, allowing or forbidding war to be 
waged. If the consequence of war outweighs its conception, then the war cannot 
be accepted. Under jus ad bellum, as suggested by Hurka, a war has to contain a 
reasonable hope of success as its highest priority. If war tends to be failed, it will 
result in destruction, and hence cannot be justified. The Next is proportionality 
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by which it determines the degree of success assessed by comparing the level of 
benefits and destruction. It is wrong, if say for instance, the damage is higher 
than the advantage. Final condition in this category is a last resort, that is, a war 
is not allowed if its benefit, though significant, could have been achieved by less 
destructive means such as diplomacy. By comparison, jus in bello criterion, 
Hurka asserts, has something in common with jus ad bellum in those of 
proportionality and last resort namely: 
An act in war is wrong if the harm it causes, especially to civilian, is out of 
proportion to its military benefits, while a necessity condition forbids acts 
that cause unnecessary harm, because the same benefits could have been 
achieved by less harmful means.53 
 
With regards to the death and damage caused by a war, on the perspective 
of Islamic doctrines, killing and murder regarded as one of the four major sins).54 
Accordingly, there must be moral obligation to other human beings, even in the 
time of war, as suggested in the Qur’an: 
Because of that, we ordained for the children of Israel that if any one 
killed a person not in retaliation of murder, or to spread mischief in the 
land, it would be as if he killed all mankind, and if any one saved a life, it 
would be as if he saved the life of all mankind.55 
 
In order to deepen the understanding of these principles, in what follows, 
one case study of jihadist theory will be analyzed, that is Imam Samudra’s 
principle of jihad in his controversial book ‘Aku Melawan Teroris’ or I fight 
against the Real Terorist.56 
 
E.  Imam Samudra’s Theory of Jihad: Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello 
Imam Samudra, a Bali bombing perpetrator, views jihad in three 
meanings. First, jihad can be literally meant ‘striving to do the best in order to 
gain one’s purpose.’ Second, jihad refers to ‘struggling to impose sharia or 
Islamic laws, to call for it, and to implement it.’ Third, jihad in the light of 
Shari’a is regarded as ‘resorting to war against infidels who fight against Islam 
and Muslims’ community.’  From these three definitions, it can be inferred that 
Samudra relates jihad to warfare, and deems it as a holy war.57   
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These three concepts of jihad, according to Samudra, are stemmed from 
the “ulama salafush saleh’ or the pious ancestors’ perspectives on jihad as the 
legitimate source to wage a war in Islamic war tradition. Those Moslem scholars, 
Samudra argues, are the most trustworthy people after the Prophet Muhammad’s 
companions. To mention some, the four scholars of Islamic jurisprudence such as 
Imam Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi’I and Hanbali, and other Moslem philosophers like 
Imam Qatadah, Imam Mujahid, Imam sufyan ibn ‘Uyainah, Imam Muqatil, Ibn 
Taymiyya, Imam Ibn Qayim al-Jauziyah.58 However, in his book, Samudra does 
not specify those Moslem scholars who become his main reference. 
Samudra’s main books of jihad rely on three important sources namely ‘al-
Jihad Sabiluna’ (Jihad is Our Way of life) by ‘Abd al-Baqi Ramdun, ‘al-Jihad’ 
(the principles of Jihad) by Syaikh ibn al-Mubarak, and ‘Fi al-Tarbiyah al-
Jihadiyah wa al-Bina’ (Education and Trainings on Jihad) by Dr ‘Abdullah 
Azzam. Nonetheless, those books are actually not available in Samudra’s hand; 
his citation relies on his memory of those books (which is immensely doubtful). 
The only book Samudra has is ‘Tafsir Ibnu Kathir’ (Quranic exegesis of Ibn 
Kathir on jihad) provided by Moslem solicitors in detention.59 
All of those three concepts of jihad, in Samudra’s view, ought to be 
applied in the four tactical steps of jihad consisting of state of being patient, 
permit to wage a war, duty to resort to a limited war, duty to fight against infidels 
and disbelievers (Samudra, 2004:123-134).60 Similarly, the first two steps falls 
under the category of Jus Ad Bellum, and the later contains Jus in Bello 
principles. 
 
Principle 1: State of Being Patient (Jus Ad Bellum I)  
According to Samudra, jihad in this step is not yet recommended. The 
Moslems are told to be patient from the aggression and humiliation of the infidels 
(the US and its alliances). Samudra exemplifies this jihadist strategy to the 
history of Islam in the time of the Prophet Muhammad when his two 
companions, Bilal ibn Rabah and Yasir family, were tortured by the Quraish 
tribe. As Hadith narrates “Be patient [Yasir], verily you deserve entering the 
paradise”(related by H.R Ahmad).61 
In addition, Samudra observes that the Islamic community all over the 
world in the contemporary global political orders are threatened by the pressure 
of converting their beliefs into Christianity and Judaism. In this stage, Samudra 
emphasizes that the Moslems have to keep their temper, keep praying and paying 
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alms to the needy, and forgiving those aggressors who oppress their firm 
beliefs.62 Samudra refers this to the Quranic verse 4:77 as follows: 
“[Prophet], do you not see those who were told, ‘Restrain yourselves from 
fighting, perform the prayer, and pay the prescribed alms? 
 
On this level, Samudra considers this stage as ‘kafful yad’ or self restrain. 
By this he means, a state when the Moslems ought to keep themselves from any 
hatred and angers upon the non-believers who attempt to challenge the 
consistence of the Moslems’ faith.63 Samudra points out the Prophet’s saying 
“Verily, I am instructed [by God] to forgive, so that you are not allowed to 
fight them [the infidels]” (Narrated by H.R. Ibnu Abi Hatim).  
 
Principle 2: Permit to Wage a War (Jus Ad Bellum II) 
In Samudra’s theory of war, waging jihad is permitted only if tortures and 
coercion upon the Moslems community have been increasing in the global scale, 
and when the Moslems are expelled from their homeland like what has been 
happening in Palestine and Afghanistan. On this account, the Moslems are only 
allowed to wage jihad, but not to fight, kill, or go to the battlefields. Samudra 
states that a permit to wage a war does not mean a declaration to resort to a war.64 
His argument is basically referred to the following Quranic verse 22:39-40 
“Those who have been attacked are permitted to take up arms because 
they have been wronged; God has the power to help them. Those who have 
been driven unjustly from their homes only for saying, ‘Our Lord is God”. 
 
Samudra argues that this verse is the first Quranic revelation concerning 
‘armed jihad’. Quoting Ibn Kathir, he claims that there are some traditional 
Moslem scholars supporting his view on this issue such as Imam Mujahid and 
Imam Adh-Dhahhak, Ibn Abbas, Urwah bin Zubair, Zaid bin Aslam, Muqatil bin 
Hayyan, Qatadah, and many more.65  
 
Principle 3: Duty to Resort to a Limited Warfare (Jus in Bello I) 
In Samudra’s opinion, the so-called ‘limited warfare’ is a war committed to 
fight solely against the infidels who fight the Moslems community. Similarly, the 
non-believers and infidels who do not oppress the Moslems are not to be fought 
or killed. On this level, waging a war is instructed and jihad becomes compulsory 
(Samudra, 2004:127).66 As the Quran 2:190 declares 
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“Fight in God’s cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the 
limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits.”  
 
Moreover, Samudra67 relates the duty of going to war with the obligation to 
fasting in Ramadhan, a holy month in Islamic calendar, with reference to the 
following Quranic verses 
Sura al-Baqarah 2:216: “Fighting is ordained for you, though you dislike 
it. You may dislike something, although it is good for you, or like 
something although it is bad for you: God knows and you do not”  
Sura al-Baqarah 2:183: “You who believe, fasting is prescribed for you, as 
it was prescribed for those before you, so that you may be mindful of God”  
 
According to Samudra, both verses are similar in essence. The first denotes 
a duty to resort to a war, and the later reveals an obligation to conduct fasting. In 
other words, it is sinful to neglect fasting, and so is refusing to go to a war.  
 
Principle 4: Duty to Fight against all Infidels and Disbelievers (Jus in Bello 
II) 
In this last strategy of war, Samudra emphasizes that all preceding Quranic 
verses within the previous stages are abrogated and replaced with the new 
commandment in the following Quranic verses:  
Sura At-Tawba 9:5: “... wherever you encounter the idolaters, kill them, 
seize them, besiege them, wait for them at every lookout post…”  
Sura At-Tawba 9:29: “Fight those of the people of the Book who do not 
[truly] believe in God and the Last Day, who do not forbid what God and 
His Messenger have forbidden, who do not obey the rule of justice, until 
they pay the tax and agree to submit”  
 
Quoting Ibn Kathir, Samudra states that both verses are named ‘verses of 
swords’ due to the fact that all infidels and disbelievers in the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad were fought and killed (by means of swords), unless they were 
repentant and embracing Islam, performing prayers and paying obliged alms.68 
In other Quranic verses, Samudra finds a continuous explanation of the so-
called ‘verses of swords’ in the Sura At-Tawba 9:36 
“…Do not wrong your souls in these months [twelve months], though you 
may fight the idolaters at any time, if the first fight you, remember that 
God is with those who are mindful of Him” 
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For him, this verse is the last Quranic revelation regarding jihad, and the 
last chapter of the Quran which conclude the personal duty to wage a war in the 
name of jihad. 
Furthermore, Samudra mentions a Hadith (the Prophet’s speech and 
tradition) in conjunction with this principle of jihad 
“I am commanded to fight against men [non-believers] till they declare 
that there is no deity except God and that Muhammad is His Messenger, 
and they are constant in prayers and pay the alms” (Narrated by al-
Bukhari and Muslim.69 
Other two Hadiths explain the roles of the Prophet Muhammad 
“I was sent near the day of Resurrection with the sword so that only God 
is worshipped and no others will be ascribed divinity to, except Him. And 
my sustenance is guaranteed to be under the shadows of my lance; and 
humiliation and debasement is to those who go against my commandment. 
Whosoever resembles a tribe he is from among that tribe” (Narrated by 
Ahmad).70 
“Know that the paradise is under the shadow of the swords” (Narrated by 
al-Bukhari and Muslim.71 
Quoting Ali bin Abi Talib’s statement, the second Islamic Caliph, Samudra 
asserts that both Hadiths connotes ‘the four swords’ to the roles of the Prophet 
Muhammad in waging jihad notably the first sword is related to fight against the 
‘polytheists’ embedded in the Quranic verse 9:5; and then the second sword is 
connected with fighting against the ‘People of the Book’ which are the Jews and 
the Christians explained in the Quranic verse, 9:29;  and the third sword is in 
accordance with God’s instruction to fight against the ‘hypocrites’ stated in the 
Quranic verse 9:73; and the last is the fourth sword which is meant fighting 
against the ‘dissenters’ mentioned in the Quranic verse 49:9.72 
Accordingly, Samudra states that the fourth step is deemed as the 
‘offensive jihad’ which is higher than the ‘defensive ones’ of the preceding steps. 
Here, he combines both strategies of jihad in Bali and he calls it the “deffoffence 
jihad.”73 
 
F.  Critique against Imam Samudra’s Theory of Jihad 
In many parts of Samudra’s book, he often states that his understanding on 
jihad comes from the theological perspectives of the so-called “al-Salaf al-Salih” 
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or the pious predecessors concerning jihad in which he considers them as the 
most righteous Moslem scholars after the Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions. For him, their thoughts are revealed from God and free from 
political motives as God and his Messenger Muhammad had guaranteed the 
authenticity and validity of their thoughts and faith. In Samudra’s view, the ‘al-
Salaf al-Salih’ is the early generation of Islamic community comprising the 
Sahabah (the Prophet’s companions), the Tabi’in (the followers of the Sahabah) 
and the Taba’ al-Tabi’in (the disciple of the Tabi’in). Moreover, Samudra asserts 
that in order to understand the types of thought of those pious Moslem ancestors, 
it would be better to read their works on Islamic laws, Islamic jurisprudence, 
jihad and so forth. He also mentions some prominent Moslem scholars of the ‘al-
Salaf al-Salih’ such as the four schools of thought notably Imam Hanafi, Maliki, 
Syafi’I and Hanbali, and the other Moslem philosophers like Imam Qatadah, 
Imam Mujaihid, Imam Sufyan ibn ‘Uyainah, Imam Muqatil, Ibn Taymiyya, and 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah.74 However, Samudra does not clarify the fundamental 
thought of this al-Salaf al-Salih, their characters, their methodology of thinking, 
and their movements which make them different from any other schools of 
thought in Islam.  
On my analysis, the al-Salaf al-Salih in its socio-political context dating 
back to the history of Islamic civilization is best defined as an Islamic social 
movement appeared in the post Prophetic era (the Prophet’s companions) and the 
two succeeding Moslem generations (the Followers and their disciples) as the 
best role-models on how Islamic teachings and practices should be done. 
Typically, the core principle of this righteous Moslem group is that Islam along 
with its teaching is perfect and complete during the early period of Islam under 
the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, but then it had 
been affected by the ‘materialist’ and ‘cultural’ circumstances.75 
Around sixth century, Salafism or Salafi movement emerged as a revival 
of  the al-Salaf al-Salih ideology intended to awake Islamic teachings which are 
close to what the Prophet Muhammad and his companions had been practising. 
One of the proponents of Salafism is Ibn Taymiyyah (611-728 H/1263-1328).76 
His classical work on the chapter of jihad can be found in al-Siyasa al-Shar’iyya 
fi islah al-Ra’I wa al-Ra’iyya  or the Governance according to God’s law in 
reforming both the ruler and his flock.77 Accordingly, the political thought of 
Salafism can be traced from Ibn Taymiyah’s view on jihad in his book. In what 
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follows, by way of assessment, Imam Samudra’s theory of jihad will be cross 
checked with that of Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad. If it is found to be 
inconsistent, Samudra’s jihadist ideology is absolutely fake and false. 
According to Ibn Taymiyyah, there are, at least, three strict conditions of 
waging jihad. First, the advantage of jihad should be intended for the sake of the 
common goods and just cause; not only for the mujahid itself (the one who 
performs jihad) but also for other Moslems. Second, jihad covers all dimensions 
of worships; both ‘inner’ (greater jihad like spiritual warfare) and ‘outer’ (lesser 
jihad concerning physical warfare). It should contain love, patience, asceticism, 
and peace, not hatred, anger, and war. Third, jihad is waged to gain the ‘ultimate 
happiness’ in the worldly life and the hereafter. It is not allowed to conduct jihad 
by means of suicide inasmuch as it falls into bida’ or innovations in jihad which 
contradict with to the Quran and the Hadith.78 The Quran 4:97 severely 
condemns the acts of killing one’s self in the guise of jihad: 
“When the angels take the souls of those who have wronged themselves, 
they ask the, ‘What circumstances were you in?’ They reply, ‘We are 
oppressed in this land,’ and the angels say, ‘But was God’s earth not 
spacious enough for you to migrate to some other place?’ These people 
will have Hell as their refuge, an evil destination…” . 
The most hazardous point of Imam Samudra’s view on jihad is his notion 
on continuous warfare against non-Moslems, non-believers, or infidels. He is 
convinced that once jihad is being instructed (step 4 of jihad), there is no choice 
but fighting and killing the non-Moslems as the Quran reveals to do so. On 
Samudra’s account, the relation between Moslems and non-Moslems is, hence, a 
war not peace.79 Samudra supports his arguments with this Quranic verse  8:39 
“[Believers], fight them until there is no more persecution, and all worship 
is devoted to God alone; if they desist, then God sees all that they do”. 
On this level, it is obvious that Samudra’s principle of jihad is at odds with 
that of Ibn Taymiyya’s second rule of waging jihad, that is, jihad should not mix 
with anger, hatred and war. Similarly, while Samudra values jihad as a violent 
act, Ibn Taymiyah sees it as peaceful way in the path of God.  
In addition, Samudra mostly claims that the thoughts of al-Salaf al-Salih 
are guaranteed by God, their deeds are protected by God, and their everlasting 
place in the hereafter life is a paradise. Based on these distinctions, Samudra 
refers almost all his conception on jihad to their schools of thought expecting that 
he would also be saved by God entering His paradise like what he believes to be 
true. Here, it is obvious that Samudra is driven by the spiritual payoffs he dreams 
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of as a divine reward from God. In this sense, Samudra seems to be irrational. 
His rationality (or irrationality) can be further explained by the rational choice 
theory stating that ‘if spiritual payoffs outweigh the negative consequence of 
strategies in the here and now, high-cost/risk activism is [absolutely] 
intelligible.80 On my account, Samudra’s misinterpretation of jihad generates a 
misleading faith. It is therefore, his wrong faith results in evil deeds. With this in 
mind, I assume that Samudra uses jihad as a spirit of his ‘high-cost/risk’ 
movement as well as abuse it as a means of justification for his terrorist acts.  
Furthermore, Samudra’s use and abuse of Quranic verses concerning jihad 
can be found in undertaking step 4 of jihad (duty to fight against all infidels and 
disbelievers) with reference to the two Quranic verses; Sura At-Tawba 9:5 and 
Sura At-Tawba 9:29.  
In the first place, Samudra explains that Sura At-Tawba 9:5 reveals a duty 
to fight all non-believers (without any exceptions) wherever they are. Samudra 
quotes only a part of this verse ”…wherever you encounter the idolaters, kill 
them, seize them, besiege them, wait for them at every lookout post…”(the 
Quran,9:5). The complete verse is as follows  
Sura At-Tawba (the Repentance, 9:5): “When the [four] forbidden months 
are over, wherever you encounter the idolaters, kill them, seize them, 
besiege them, wait for them at every lookout post; but if they turn [to 
God], maintain the prayer, and pay the prescribed alms, let them go on 
their way, for God is most forgiving and merciful”. 
 
If it is taken for granted, the verse might be meant God’s commandment to 
fight all non-Moslem wherever they reside in, and the war is going to end if they 
are repentant and embracing Islam. Nevertheless, this verse cannot be separated 
from the preceding verse and the verse coming after it. For instance, the Quranic 
verse 9:1 which is the first part of this chapter denotes a delay of the armistice 
made between the Moslem and the non-Moslem group. Historically, this verse 
was revealed when the battle of Tabouk occurred in the 9th year of the Islamic 
calendar (around 630 AD). It has been rumoured that the Byzantine emperor led 
by Heraclius was going to attack the Moslem community with a huge number of 
army approximately 40,000 to 100, 000 soldiers approaching the restricted area 
of Tabouk. The Moslem army under the Prophet Muhammad was ready to go to 
the battlefield of Tabouk to fight against the Byzantine soldiers, but when they 
reached there, there was nothing but staying there for a couple of days. Finally, 
the truce was over due to this rumour.81 Here, it appears that the historical 
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background of the descent of this verse is nothing more than ensuring the 
postpone of the agreement made between the two groups. As the previous verse 
confirms this historical fact in the Quran 8:58 
“And if you learn of treachery on the part of any people, throw their 
treaty back at them, for God does not love the treacherous”  
Afterwards, the following chapter of the Quranic verse 9:2 proclaims 
“You [idolaters] may move freely about the land for four months, but 
you should bear in mind both that you will not escape God, and that 
God will disgrace those who defy [Him]”. 
In this regards, the Byzantine army is offered only two options; 
surrendering or waging a war. This warning lasts only four months. If they were 
surrendering, they would be saved under the protection of Moslem constitutional 
laws of warfare.82 The Quran 9:3 further declares 
On the day of the Great Pilgrimage [there will be] a proclamation from 
God and His Messenger to all people: ‘God and his Messenger are 
released from [treaty] obligations to the idolaters. It will be better for you 
[idolaters] if you repent; know that you cannot escape God if you turn 
away [Prophet], warn those who ignore [God] that they will have a 
painful punishment.”  
Followed respectively by the Quranic verse 9:4 stating that this warning 
does not apply for  
“…those who have honoured the treaty you made with them and who have 
not supported anyone against you: fulfil your agreement with them to the 
end of their term…”  
Exception is also given for non-Moslems in the following category (the 
Quran, 4:90) 
“But as for those who seeks refuge with people with whom you have a 
treaty, or who come over to you because their hearts shrink from fighting 
against you or against their own people, God could have given them power 
over you, and they have fought you. So if they withdraw and do not fight 
you, and offer you peace, then God gives you no way against them”  
Having analysed, it is apparent that Samudra’s view in regards to his 
interpretation of Quranic verse 9:5 (step 4 of jihad) on fighting and killing any 
non-Moslem groups with no exceptional conditions is definitely unjustifiable. 
Understanding Quranic texts without looking at its socio-political context 
surrounded its revelation would be going astray and misleading. In this sense, it 
seems that Samudra’s principle of jihad is incorrect and contradictory. 
                                                 
82M. Quraish Shihab. Tafsir al-Mishbah: Pesan, Kesan dan Keserasian al-Quran or al-
Misbhah Quranic Exegesis: Messages, Impression, and the Conformity of the Quran. (Jakarta: 
Lentera Hati, 2002),Vol.5, 496-497. 
Najamudin 
22 I Indo-Islamika, Volume 2, Nomor 2, 2015/1437  
G.  Conclusion 
Having compared, jihad and just war theory (JWT) have something in 
common and something different in characters. Using JWT as a theoretical 
framework in approaching  jihad, it has been proven that jihad is not only meant 
as striving or struggling, but also a set of doctrines on the conduct to war, jus ad 
bellum, and the conduct of war, jus ad bello.  It has been argued that the 
principles of jihad are not as structured as JWT due to its complexities. The 
Qur’an, Hadits, and historical facts regarding jihad denote only values and 
doctrines on waging wars in Islam. Nonetheless, as suggested by Bulliet, this 
comparative analysis is still helpful in relating Islam and other civilization in 
order to trace its parallel historical lineage in terms of theories, doctrines, and 
principles of wars.  
Furthermore, under the framework of jus ad bellum and jus ad bello, this 
study reveals that if jihad is seen as holy, just and sacred, no one will justified to 
commit terrorism and violence under the guise of jihad. Moreover, using juristic 
and theological approach of jihad, this study finds that Imam Samudra, one of the 
masterminds of Bali bombing, is guilty of using some Quranic verses regarding 
jihad and abusing it to justify his attacks on the island. His jihadist apologetics 
was compiled in his controversial book “Aku Melawan Teroris” (trans: I Fight 
against the Real Terrorists). In addition, this work suggests that counter 
ideological works against terrorists who utilize jihad as a means of justification 
should be addressed thoroughly. 
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